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The Law Professor as Schizophrenic
Suzanna Sherry

that we don't put

adopt the "law professor as astrophysicist"

political science into our case
and Gerald Rosenberg levels the

model: we think we can master any field in the
time it takes to research and write an article.1

same charge at our scholarship. And so it has

It doesn't help, as Rosenberg points out, that

fallen to me to defend the ranks of law profes

we rarely learn from our students and that we

DEVINS

SAYS

sors from these scurrilous accusations. Unfor

allow them. complete authority qver scholarly

tunately, I can't do it: Rosenberg, at least, is

publications.
But what is the solution? Rosenberg seems

largely right.
Rosenberg's delightful little polemic has

to despair of finding one, but I think he might

accurately diagnosed the problem. Law profes

be too pessimistic. Not all law professors are -

sors as a group are too arrogant, too disdainful

or can ever become - competent in other dis

of empirical information in favor of grand

ciplines, but many can and do. And I 'm sure

abstractions, and appallingly willing to write

that not all political scientists rank at the top

in disciplines of which they are woefully igno

of their fields either. (See, I can do mathemat

rant. There are many exceptions, of course:

ics, too!) Laments like Rosenbergs, and the

with or without additional degrees, some law

examples provided by such legal scholars as

professors are competent - even excellent -

Mark Tushnet, Barry Friedman, Dan Farber,

historians,

economists,

and others who actually read broadly, will con

sociologists, and the like. But too many of us

tinue to improve the intellectual quality of

political

scientists,

Suzanna Sherry is the Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law at the University of
Minnesota. She thanks Jim Chen, Paul Edelman, and Dan Farber for comments. She states at the outset that she
has never authored a constitutional law casebook, and indeed no longer teaches basic constitutional law on a
regular basis (unless one counts federal jurisdiction as a constitutional course).
1

For recent - and devastating - critiques of this phenomenon, see Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the

Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996), and Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational
Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in Interdisciplinary Research, 71 WASH. L. REv. 5 1 (1996).
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legal scholarship.2 Moreover,

collaborative

and implications of constitutional doctrine:

efforts between law professors and members

looking,

of other disciplines seem to be on the rise.

between the ebb and flow of abortion doctrine

Patience is a virtue: after all, only relatively

and abortion rates, unwed motherhood,

recently have law schools begun to think of

children living in poverty?

themselves as academic institutions rather
than as mere training schools.

for example,

at the interactions

The problem is that we don't have time for
everything that would be interesting and use

Which leads me to Neal Devins' sugges

ful. So the question is whether the sorts of

tions. He, too, offers a solution of sorts to the

materials that Devins suggests are more

problem Rosenberg identifies. Devins wants

important than what is currently in the case

to put the political science into the casebooks,

books. And I just can't see how the average law

where neither students nor professors can

student would be better off reading fewer

ignore it. I will leave aside the question

Supreme Court cases and more material on

whether casebooks are the best way to

legislative and executive decisions.

broaden the horizons of law professors. And

Maybe William and Mary students regu

although Devins has certainly made some

larly go off to become lobbyists, and therefore

intriguing suggestions for an ideal constitu

need to be taught how to "advance their inter

tional law curriculum, I have some difficulty in

ests in both LJudicial and non-judicial] sec
6
tors." Most of my students don't, so focusing

understanding why he thh1ks

law students need

on basic skills like reading cases and interpret

that curriculum.
Wea all like to supplement our constitu

ing and using precedent is more important for

tional courses with interesting and relevant

them. And even lobbying is easier if you can

materials. For example, in addition to the

understand and argue the relevant cases: when

political context of constitutional decision

several law professors testified before Con

making, shouldn't we teach our students about

gress that the federal anti-flag burning statute

the historical context of the Constitution and
3
its interpretation:1 And wouldn't comparative

some creative (some might say fanciful) argu

would be constitutional, they had to make

constitutional law add tremendous value to
current constitutional courses:14 How about a

ments to distinguish

game theoretic analysis of Supreme Court vot
5
ing behavior:1 Or examining the social context

using the constitutional law course as simply

Texas v. Johnson.

In short, Devins overlooks the possibility of
another vehicle for instructing students in the

2 It's always nice to name y our friends in a law review article, which is why I picked these three out of
the many possible examples. Apologies to all those whose names would have been equally
appropriate.

3 Shameless plug: For those who truly want to s1,1pplement a constitutional course with historical
material on the drafting and ratification of the I789 Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the
Reconstruction Amendments, there is a handy paperback available. See Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION (West I990).
4 See Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Foundation Press
I999)·
5 Another shameless plug: See Paul H. Edelman & Suzanna Sherry, All or Nothing: Explaining the Size of
Supreme Court Majorities,
N. CAR. L. REv. _(forthcoming 2000); Paul H. Edelman & Jim
Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 63
(1996).
6 Neal Devins, How Constitutional Law Casebooks Perpetuate the My th of Judicial Supremacy, 3 GREEN BAG
20 259, 261 (2000).
_

274

3 GREEN

BAG 20

273

The Law Professor as Schizophrenic
common law method, textual interpretation,

attribute any disagreement on that score to

reasoning by analogy, critical thinking, and all

political viewpoints.

the various modes of legal argument. My

The problem is that at least some of consti

experience is that law students need all the

tutional law is similar to the rest of law in that

practice they can get in these areas, and that

it depends on an ability to read (and manipu

many upper class courses already give such

late) precedent, to interpret (and misinter

skills short shrift in favor of loading up the

pret)

students with technical knowledge of the par

traditionally called legal arguments. The fact

text,

and to make what we have

ticular subject matter. The constitutional law

that constitutional law is already at the politi

course is ideal as a counterweight, since the

cal end of the traditional continuum makes it

subject matter is not highly technical and most

difficult for students to understand that the

students won't need to know the details of the

constitutional law course is not just a free-for

doctrines anyway.

all debate about the wisdom of particular poli

But besides cutting into time more usefully

cies. But because they think its all politics,

used on other skills, I am afraid that imple

they bristle at any attempt to channel or criti

menting Devins' suggestions would have even

cize their arguments. Again, I'm not talking

more pernicious effects. I taught a traditional

about policy or controversial political deci

case-centered constitutional law course to

sions: I'm talking about basic legal skills. I

first-year students for more thai;i 15 years. I

have had students in constit:lli:ional law tell me

have recently begun teaching civil procedure

that my "interpretation" of the Courts actual

instead. And the differences in students' reac

holding in a particular case was incorrect,

tions to the two courses persuades me that fol

insist that strict scrutiny would be applied -

lowing Devins' program would exacerbate all

under

of the problems of teaching constitutional law.

a hypothetical that explicitly included no

Students come in believing that constitu·

intent to discriminate, or suggest that such

existing equal

protection precedent - to

tional law is nothing but politics, and that

terms as "privileges or immunities," ·aue pro

they're as good at political argument as the

cess of law;" and "equal protection of the laws"

next person - or the next Justice. Thus, they

are not in the least ambiguous or open-tex

often view even the most basic instruction

tured, but instead have fixed meanings that

from the teacher as 'Just Professor Xs political

can be linguistically (not historically) resolved.

bias showing again." Let me stress that I am

And they presume that if I disagree, I am just

not referring to controversial questions on

viewing the cases through a political lens dif

methods of interpretation

ferent from their own.

or

validity

of

results, but only the basic skills of legal analy

In civil procedure, by contrast, the students

sis and argument. Does any constitutional law

are willing - even eager - for any help a pro

teacher think that

Wade is well-written

fessor can give them in learning basic legal

or well-reasoned, even if it reaches the right

'skills and deciphering cases, because they don't

result? Some of my students have insisted that

view the decisions as political or themselves as

Roe

v.

it is, and that only political considerations

experts. And its not the content, its the atti

would lead one to criticize the opinion. Does

tude. For example, when a student recently

Mar

tried to make the argument that because the

of dicta or that

minimal scrutiny test is so weak, a constitu

any constitutional law teacher deny that

bury contained quite a bit
Brown v. Board of Education

and its progeny

tional challenge subject to minimal scrutiny

ducked some important questions? Many of

should be dismissed under 12(b )( 6), he hap

my students have tried to deny both, and to

pily accepted my contention that the more

G
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appropriate judicial response might be to

Maybe I'm just a traditionalist. But if

grant summary judgment. Even more tellingly,

make any claim at all to be teaching students

the students routinely actually try to apply the

something that they do not learn as under

Courts test(s) for the constitutional reach of

graduates and will need as lawyers, it ought to

we

personal jurisdiction - a typically slippery

be the core methods of legal analysis - what is

constitutional doctrine if there ever was one -

sometimes disparagingly called "thinking like a

rather than resorting to the political argu

lawyer." I can think of no better way to under·

ments they usually made in discussions of due

mine this goal than by reinforcing the stu·

process in the constitutional law course.

dents' belief that constitutional law is just

Devins' substitution of other materials for
court cases in

constitutional

politics by another name.

law simply

The reader may wonder, then, why I think

increases these differences between the two

Rosenberg is right to insist that law professors

courses, taking even more of the "law" out of
constitutional law. Such a curriculum would

·

should integrate more non-legal materials into
their scholarship but that Devins is wrong to

only reinforce the students' unwillingness to

extend that broadening tendency into teach·

view constitutional law as law.

ing. The answer turns on the fundamental

To the extent that we keep the constitu

paradox of law teaching: unlike academics in

tional course court-centered, we can empha

virtually every other discipline, our students

size its similarity to other subjects and

are not going to follow in our footsteps. We

therefore steer the students toward typical

are academics; they are going to be lawyers.

legal analysis. While I 'm not advocating teach

(Theres also another difference between law

ing the students that constitutional decisions

and every other academic discipline: law is the

are

political, I think focusing on the

only field in which the students edit the jour·

political context of constitutional decision

nals and the professors grade the exams - now

never

making would simply strengthen the students'

what does

pre-existing belief that constitutional deci

of law professors?)

sions are

always and onry

political. And then

large numbers of them can write off the course

that suggest

about the competence

In general, the attitudes and skills that

we

are trying to teach our students do not always

as just a political science seminar· that will

overlap with the demands of scholarship. Let

never be important to them as lawyers.

me take one of my own passions as an example:

It should be apparent, then, that I also dis

What fascinates me most about current Elev·

agree with Rosenberg's criticism that there is a

enth Amendment jurisprudence is the wrong

disconnect between what law; schools teach

turns the Supreme Court has been taking ever

and what lawyers do. The counseling, negoti

since Hans v. Louisiana. There is a vast scholarly

ating, bargaining, and mediating that Rosen

literature on the historical and political context

berg suggests are the largest part of a lawyer's

of Article Ill, the Eleventh Amendment, and

job all take place against background assump

the subsequent cases. To my mind, that litera·

tions about the state of the law and its poten

ture raises serious questi6ns about current

tial application or alteration. The skills we

doctrine. My students are minimally exposed

teach in traditional Socratic classes - the abil

to these questions through reading the dissent·

ity

ing opinions in

to assimilate abstract information in

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Flor·
Alden v. Maine. But except for the

advance and then to respond quickly and artic

ida

ulately to unexpected questions or statements

handful who might go on to become law pro·

or to additional information - are also vital to

fessors, they will probably never have to care

the tasks Rosenberg identifies.

whether

3 GREEN

BAG
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rightly or wrongly decided. They simply need

cases. Moreover, there is certainly value in

to be able to understand and apply the cases,

helping our students become reflective about

and to be able to argue creatively for limits and

law, even if there is no immediate practical

extensions.

Even

the

Supreme

Court

is

import. We are still academics and they are

unlikely to be receptive to a brief that points

still students, so a partial continuation of their

out that Hans was a consequence of the judicial

liberal arts education is warranted. But we

abandonment of Reconstruction - and a fed

must be careful not to allow our own intellec

eral district court will consider such an argu

tual interests to overwhelm the students' legal

ment truly bizarre. So while the scholars

education. This is a difficult balance to main

exploring these questions should continue to

tain, and Devins' suggestions would destroy it.

consult as many non-legal sources as possible,

Gerald Rosenberg may well be right that

there is no justification for a thorough treat

we law professors are more like practitioners
than lik� academics. That attribute is detri

ment of such sources in the dassroom.7
It

is

thus

unsurprising,

and

indeed

mental tQ our scholarship, but it is vitally nec

divergence

essary to our teaching. We must be careful to

between scholarship and teaching materials.

remember that we are teaching future lawyers,

expected,

that

there

is

some

Obviously, some scholarly ideas should - and

not future academics. At the same time, we

do - make their way into teaching materials.

should not let that educational mission cabin

To give but a single example (from among
8
many), John Hart Ely's ideas provide an

creativity. In other words, we all have to be two

our scholarship or keep us from intellectual

accessible and insightful way for students to

people at the same time. No wonder every

think about the Courts Equal Protection

body keeps picking on, us.

/jB

7 Perceptive readers - at least those who happen to teach Federal Jurisdiction - may notice that I do
not always practice what I preach. The Eleventh Amendment chapter (for which I was largely
responsible) of my co-authored casebook on Federal Jurisdiction probably contains far too extensive
a discussion of the "diversity explanation" and its critics, and overly lengthy excerpts from dissenting
opinions. But Professor Devins, I take it, would further expand that discussion.
8 See John Hart Ely, DBMOCRACY

G

AND

DISTRUST (1980).
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